
Ogi’s European charm offensive
In 1993, the Federal Council launched a charm offensive, fronted by Switzerland’s president Ogi, to pave the way for bilateral negotiations with the EU following the historic outcome of the EEA referendum of 6 December 1992.
Chancellor Kohl described himself as a friend of the Swiss Confederation. And Switzerland was in desperate need of friends at the time. On 6 December 1992, the Swiss electorate had rejected proposals for the country to become a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). The Federal Council was openly in favour of acceding to the EEA, seeing this as a step towards closely integrating Switzerland into the growing European Community. It had resolved on membership of the EU as a strategic goal in the autumn of 1991‒ an objective in need of a rethink following the vote against ratifying the EEA Agreement. Therefore, in 1993, the Federal Council ‒ acting contre coeur ‒ was faced with the task of persuading Brussels and the member states to accept Switzerland as a special case with regard to European integration, at least temporarily.
EC or EU?
The European Community (EC) was formed in 1967 as an amalgamation of the European Economic Community, Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community. The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993 made the EC the main pillar of the newly established European Union (EU). The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was founded by Switzerland and another six nations in 1960 as a reaction to the process of European integration. The European Economic Area (EEA) was originally conceived in 1989 as an umbrella covering the EC and EFTA. After Switzerland rejected the EEA Agreement and fellow EFTA member states Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU in 1995, its significance waned rapidly.
But the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe were also seeking to establish ties with the EU. Therefore, although Chancellor Kohl had every sympathy for the unique situation of the Swiss Confederation, he found that “simple common sense dictates that Switzerland must soon change course and apply for EC membership”. “In the long term, the Swiss will get nowhere by being stubborn,” he warned the gathering at the Lohn estate.
The members of the Federal Council were to repeat this mantra ad nauseum throughout 1993 at an unprecedented number of meetings with Europe’s top politicians.
Head of state Ogi did it in January at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and again in the spring, with backing from Federal Councillors Cotti and Delamuraz, during a working visit to Bern by British prime minister John Major. In June, while visiting Paris, Ogi was unexpectedly received by French president François Mitterrand at the Élysée Palace. Ogi immediately invited Mitterrand to come and visit him in his home village in the Bernese Oberland, which the Frenchman did on 3 December. Ogi greeted Mitterrand in typically disarming fashion with the words: “Monsieur le Président, vous aimez la Suisse, et les Suisses vous aiment [Mr President, you love Switzerland, and the Swiss love you]”.
This was not something that could have been taken for granted. The EC member states from southern Europe in particular put strong pressure on Switzerland. Portugal’s prime minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva had already expressed his disappointment at the vote against the EEA to Ogi at the WEF, and gave him to understand that he now expected Switzerland to make “certain gestures, for example with regard to family reunification (guest workers) or cohesion”.
As it turned out, Lisbon was using Bern’s status as a petitioner in the bilateral agreements as leverage in the affair surrounding the disposal of several thousand tonnes of salt slag that a Swiss company had exported to Portugal. Although Ambassador Franz von Däniken, the leading official at the FDFA, recognised that exporting industrial waste was a problematic business, he found that “Making such a problem the focus of bilateral relations with another, supposedly friendly western European nation and attempting to solve it by referring to Switzerland’s integration policy concerns in an approach tantamount to blackmail, shows bad taste and defies all sense of proportion”.


Joint research

This text is the product of a collaboration between the Swiss National Museum (SNM) and the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland Research Centre (Dodis). The SNM researches images relating to Swiss foreign policy in the archives of the Agency Actualités Suisses de Lausanne (ASL) and Dodis contextualises these photographs on the basis of official source material. The files for 1993 were published on the Dodis internet database on 1 January 2024. The documents cited in the text and other files from the volume Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland 1993 are available online.


