War relies on manpower. When conflicts arose within the Confederacy, the Villmergen wars for example, foreign mercenaries were preferred to local fighters. Central Swiss soldiers going to the second Battle of Villmergen. Painting by Johann Franz Strickler c. 1712. Swiss National Museum

The use of mercenaries by Zurich and Bern against central Switzerland

In the 17th century, Zurich and Bern took steps to bring in foreign troops for support in conflicts against their catholic countrymen. Why was their own militia not enough and what did the two cities hope to gain by bringing in mercenaries to fight for them?

Sarah Rindlisbacher Thomi

Sarah Rindlisbacher Thomi is a lecturer in pre-modern Swiss history at the Institute of History of the University of Bern.

The thirteen cantons of the old Swiss Confederacy were widely known as mercenary providers during pre-modern times. Between 10,000 and 20,000 men fought for princes and monarchs on the battlefields of Europe during the early modern period and were well paid for doing so. The old Confederacy is also well known for its traditional military militia system. The Swiss cantons in the 17th century did not follow the general European practice of maintaining expensive mercenary armies, they preferred the cheaper militia version. It is, however, a little known fact that the Swiss also resorted occasionally to hiring foreign soldiers to fight against their countrymen. The minutes of a conference meeting between Zurich and Bern from 1628 state the following:

And it is hereby deemed necessary that a number of foreign soldiers are hired immediately on foot and horseback on behalf of and paid for jointly pro rata by each canton and at whatever cost is necessary.

Minutes of a conference meeting between Zurich and Bern from 1628

How does this fit with the federal militia system and the role of the cantons as providers of mercenaries? And why did Zurich and Bern want to recruit foreign fighters? The spirit of brotherhood was little more than a pipe dream among the Swiss in the 17th century. In reality, there were deep underlying divisions in Switzerland at that time. This led to repeated armed conflicts between Zurich und Bern, on one side, and the central Swiss cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden and Zug on the other (Kappel Wars 1529/1531 and Villmergen Wars 1656/1712). Many internecine conflicts were resolved before they became violent, although the resentment continued to simmer beneath the surface. These confrontations stemmed basically from the different religious beliefs following the Reformation that split Switzerland into Catholic and Protestant camps. Power-political interests, territorial disputes and differing positions regarding dominion sometimes tipped the balance in favour of war. The particular interest of Zurich and Bern in acquiring outside military support stemmed from the reformatory bans on hiring mercenaries, which were lifted in the first half of the 16th century (Bern) and start of the 17th century (Zurich). Even post-ban, there was only halting mercenary recruitment compared to central Switzerland. As a result, both cities were short of battle-hardened veterans and officers who had gained experience on the battlefields of Europe. This was reflected in the shortcomings of their own militia.

**Soldiers needed not only to be willing but trained as well. Depiction of the loading process for a muzzle-loader in the Zurich war manual of 1651.** ETH library

This made Bernese colonel Hans Ludwig von Erlach despair of his prospects of making the Bern militia battle ready. His attempts to reform his men, who were mainly farming folk with families, proved futile. In 1633, Von Erlach wrote to the Bern Council that he experienced heart palpitations every time he had to command the Bern troops guarding the border. He asked the Members of the Council to spare him the task of working with these unmanageable people and to give him another assignment that he could command more effectively. These were the words of a man familiar with the reality of war who had served in various German and Swedish armies and rose to one of the highest ranks in the French army. However, the Bern militia seemed too much for him: “They are as reluctant as they are negligent, they have no discipline, no love for their country, as soon as they reach their post they start loudly demanding money [...]; the officers lack experience as do their soldiers, they don’t know how to defend the border, none of them.”

**Portrait of Hans Ludwig von Erlach c. 1650.** Wikimedia

The situation was no better in Zurich. The two colonels Kaspar Schmid and Viktor Escher inspected the Zurich militia in 1630 and concluded that the infantry were poorly trained in weapon use, only one tenth of the 10,000 soldiers could use a rifle (and even then not with great proficiency). Anyone standing near them was more at risk “of being shot by them than by the enemy”. Zurich General Hans Rudolf Werdmüller, who commanded the Zurich troops during the first Villmergen War in 1656, complained bitterly about the poorly equipped and ill-disciplined army with its timid and cowardly officers following defeat on the field of battle.

**Zurich General Hans Rudolf Werdmüller despaired of his soldiers’ battle readiness.** Swiss National Museum

The Zurich and Bern militias were clearly unable to stand their ground in the event of a conflagration. The central Swiss militias, on the other hand, which counted many former mercenaries and officers in their ranks, were much more capable in battle than the forces of the protestant cantons. The solution was obvious: both cities wanted a special unit of their own mercenaries to include within the homegrown militia. Zurich and Bern saw a number of benefits ensuing from that. Poor discipline and inadequate training were only part of the problem with the militia army. There was also the fact that the councillors in Zurich and Bern could not afford to alienate their rural-dwelling subjects as it could have led to revolt and unrest. Unlike the neighbouring monarchies, the political elites in the Swiss Confederacy depended on the compliance of the peasantry for military defence.

Coat of arms in memory of the victory over the Bernese at the first Battle of Villmergen on 24 January 1656. The glass pane was ordered by Father Pius Kreuel from the Monastery of Einsiedeln, who was governor of Pfäffikon at the time and depicts the view of the war from the monastery. Swiss National Museum

Weaponised conflict involves the risk of death or injury. People in pre-modern times were understandably very reluctant to assume this risk. As Zurich military adviser Johannes Haller succinctly put it in 1620: the Council should recruit foreign mercenaries as their casualties will cause significantly less disquiet than those of pious citizens and the peasantry, the people whose lives would otherwise be at risk in military engagements. On the other hand, if “there are fatalities among mercenaries, we don’t have to worry about them being mourned or have to support their wives and children”. The citizens of Zurich and Bern had to be spared, unlike the foreign mercenaries, which is why the latter were especially to the fore in high-risk operations, storming a defensive line for example. Furthermore, the militia men mostly worked the land and had to return to the fields and keep the people fed, while mercenaries could remain operational for longer.

In the Battle of Villmergen it was halberds versus firearms. The result was clear: 1 – nil to the good old thrust, chop, slash! — In the first Villmergen War of 1656, the relatively well-armed Bern forces suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the catholic central Swiss cantons, whose soldiers were mainly armed with pikes and launched violent assaults en masse, as during the 16th century. Wikimedia

The flip side of the so-called ‘Hausvätermiliz’, which translates as militia of fathers, was that it mainly comprised husbands with children – some of whom were serving instead of their sons – and who, if they died, would leave behind widows and orphans. The municipalities or authorities were responsible for supporting those left behind. Hiring mercenaries was therefore also a social policy measure to prevent the depletion of the rural population in time of war. Zurich and Bern were particularly interested in mounted troops as they experienced difficulty in establishing their own cavalry.

The loss of a father or son was particularly hard for peasant families that were already living on the breadline. That was another reason for hiring foreign mercenaries. A poor family in their hovel, etching from 1817. Swiss National Museum

So, where to recruit these mercenaries and did they have military experience? Zurich and Bern mainly recruited from their nearby protestant allies. The Duke of Württemberg was often approached for mounted troops as well as foot soldiers, as they were easily mobilised from there. Zurich and Bern also recruited men from the Electoral Palatinate and Hessen as well as – during the Thirty Years’ War – Sweden. There were also plans to approach England and the Netherlands for funds to bring in soldiers from Grisons and southern Germany.

**Recruitment of soldiers during the Thirty Years’ War. Engraving by Jacques Callot, 1633.** Rijksmuseum Amsterdam

However, the recruitment drive only had, at best, limited success. In 1664, the Electoral Palatinate and Hessen promised to send mercenaries in the event of a future emergency, but only a very small number – if any – seem to have actually arrived. In any case, they failed to make a material difference on the battlefield. There are several reasons for that: there were constant whispers in Zurich and Bern warning against relying on foreign troops. They could only be trusted conditionally and there would be trouble among the peasantry if mercenaries were billeted among them. In addition, armed conflicts within the Confederacy usually only lasted a few weeks, not long enough to establish a proper mercenary force. As the Elector of the Palatinate remarked to the Zurich authorities in 1664, he couldn’t simply magic mercenaries out of thin air. It took time and, most of all, money to set up a mercenary force; both of which were in short supply from Zurich and Bern. This sense of cakeism hampered their recruitment efforts: they wanted highly professional and expendable troops quickly and cheaply.

**Soldiers partying in front of a hostelry and not endearing themselves to the locals. Engraving by Frans van den Wijngaerde, after Peter Paul Rubens, c. 1650.** Rijksmuseum Amsterdam

In spite of that, Zurich und Bern’s militia-related woes came to an end following the defeat in the first Villmergen War in 1656. Both cantons acknowledged that their troops were in a sorry state and reforms were needed. They also made further efforts from the last third of the 17th century to recruit mercenaries from within Switzerland. However, Zurich and Bern still could not discard foreign military expertise. They sent their people as mercenaries and officers to the Netherlands, an advanced and protestant military power at the time. This exchange was successful and the Netherlands, in addition to France, became the main destination for Swiss mercenaries. This ‘Kriegsschule’ (military college), as it was known in Zurich and Bern, finally started to make a difference on the ground in the early 18th century. There were still occasional dissenting voices about the militia system in Zurich, for example many Zurich citizens registered as cavalry without owning a horse during the 1680s just to avoid the regular shooting days. Meanwhile, in Bern the military reorganisations proved effective and the Zurich-Bern militia armies achieved a major victory over the central Swiss troops in the second Villmergen War in 1712. Foreign mercenaries hardly featured in that conflict, but the military know-how acquired outside Switzerland more than likely made all the difference.