The Battle of Bicocca

The Battle of Bicocca marked a turning point during the long Italian Wars (1494-1559). The inability of the French to control their Swiss mercenaries contributed to their loss, while the success of Spanish arquebusiers signaled the rise of Spain as a major European power. The battle additionally heralds the end of the era in which Swiss pikemen were the scourge of the medieval European battlefield.

James Blake Wiener

James Blake Wiener is a world historian, Co-Founder of World History Encyclopedia, writer, and PR specialist, who has taught as a professor in Europe and North America.

Website: worldhistory.org

The Shadow of Marignano

Immense social change and shifting political currents characterized the Old Swiss Confederation in the years following the Battle of Marignano (1515). Although the Swiss had fought with bravery and gumption, the humiliation of defeat at Marignano engendered a flurry of contentious debates within the nation as to the long-term viability of the mercenary system. Bribes had tainted political offices, resulting in unbridled political corruption. Anti-French and anti-Papal sentiments reached a crescendo and spread like wildfire, while rural populations denounced the greed of foreign recruiters and the urban patrician families who benefited the most from the mercenary system. In truth, the mercenary system had depleted the Confederation of its manpower and social cohesion. In larger Swiss towns and cities, like Luzern, the willingness of young men to serve as mercenaries, coupled with high mortality rates, led to a shortage of skilled workers. Meanwhile bands of ex-mercenary soldiers and lawless militia servicemen – distinguishable by their torn pants and slashed sleeves – roamed the countryside, sparking violence in their pursuit of quick capital, sex, and liquor. Defenseless against these transgressions, the Swiss peasantry saw their livelihoods decimated.

"The Swiss retreat at Marignan”, lithograph from around 1822. — **The Swiss retreat at Marignano, lithograph from around 1822.** e-rara

The mood was particularly sour in Zürich where mobs formed and demanded compensation for their losses. Zwingli, who had witnessed the horrors of Marignano firsthand, shared the contempt and frustrations of the common people. He compared the French and Papal recruiters to the devil beguiling Eve in the Garden of Eden in his sermons throughout 1520-1521. Zwingli’s anti-mercenary stance had broad popular support in Zürich – only a handful of villages in Canton Zürich expressed an interest in renewing the old French alliance – but Zwingli’s opinions were not shared uniformly across the Confederation. Powerful patrician families and Catholic prelates alike had no interest in abandoning the mercenary system altogether. The subsequent Treaties of Freiburg (1516) and Luzern (1521) confirmed and revived Franco-Swiss cooperation, but Zürich refused to renew its alliance and mercenary contracts with France. It would instead pursue a more isolationist policy in contrast to other cantons.

If someone sews a white cross onto himself, he signals to himself that he wants to be [a] Swiss.

“So einer ein wyss krütz an sich näyet, so verzeichnet er sich, das er ein Eidgenoss welle syn.” - Zwingli, u0022Von dem Touffu0022 (1525)

Valois and Habsburg Clash Again

In the wider sphere of European power politics, the victory of Francis I of France (r. 1515-1547) at Marignano made France the dominant power in Italy. With the Duchy of Milan firmly in French hands, the wily Francis I dreamed of resurrecting the claims of his predecessors to the Kingdom of Naples, which was then under the control of Spain. The old dream of a “Franco-Italia” – a French imperium in Italy – seemed well within the realm of tangibility. However, just like his predecessors, Francis I faced direct opposition from the Habsburg dynasty to French pretensions of suzerainty. In his desire to mitigate the threat posed by the Habsburgs, Francis I attempted to secure the title of Holy Roman Emperor for himself by bribing several of the seven prince-electors upon the death of the elderly Emperor Maximilian I in 1519. It was a bold scheme, but Francis I’s expenditures were in vain. The prince-electors selected Maximilian I’s grandson, the teenage Charles V (r. 1519-1556) – who had already ruled as King of Spain, as “Carlos I”, from 1516 – as the new emperor in Frankfurt am Main. With far deeper pockets and a ceaseless conviction in the primacy of the Holy Roman Emperor vis-à-vis other European monarchs, Charles V would, in time, become Francis I’s implacable, personal enemy.

Personal enemies: Charles V of Austria (left) and Francis I of France (right). Wikimedia

Francis I had every reason to be concerned – Charles V’s domains were the most-extensive in Europe since the reign of Charlemagne. They consisted of not only the Holy Roman Empire, but also the Spanish Empire in Europe and the Americas, the Burgundian Low Countries, and the Austrian crown lands. Moreover, Charles V knew too that political hegemony in Europe rested on the dominance of Italy. It was only a matter of time before the simmering rivalry between Valois and Habsburg would once more boil over and recommence the Italian Wars.

The colored areas show the European dominions (Castille, Aragon, Burgundian possessions, Austrian hereditary lands, Holy Roman Empire) of Charles V after his election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. — The colored areas show the European dominions (Castille, Aragon, Naples, the Burgundian possessions, Austrian hereditary lands, and the Holy Roman Empire) of Charles V after his election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. Wikimedia

Francis I mulled over his options as he pondered the existential threat posed by Charles V at home and abroad. As Charles V was a close relation or ally to the heads of Europe’s leading states – Portugal, Savoy, Denmark, England, Poland, and Hungary – Francis I felt encircled on all fronts. Nonetheless, Francis I had successfully negotiated with the Swiss, and a steady stream of Swiss mercenaries began once more to enter French employment. Francis I would bide his time and play a careful diplomatic game of “hate and wait” until he found the right opportunity to strike Charles V. For although Charles V’s empire was vast, so too were his difficulties in managing it. A propitious moment arrived in the summer 1521 as the distracted Charles V faced an ongoing peasant revolt in Frisia, two major rebellions in Spain, and the conclusion of the contentious Diet of Worms in Germany. Francis I ordered his armies to attack Luxembourg and Navarre, thereby launching the start of the Italian War of 1521-1526. Although the French achieved minor successes along the Franco-Spanish frontier, Imperial forces easily repelled French forces in the Low Countries.

Initial Skirmishes and the u0022Swissu0022 Factor

With hostilities declared, Charles V wasted no time in securing an anti-French alliance with Pope Leo X. As Milan was an imperial fief and the locus of French power in Italy, it became the target of a coordinated attack. It is worth remembering that Charles V had requested soldiers and financial assistance from the Swiss in his quest for Milan but was refused – the Confederation wished to minimize the possibility of Swiss men fighting one another on the battlefield. Charles V would ultimately recruit Landsknecht from Swabia and Tyrol instead. Meanwhile, Papal forces from Mantua and Spanish armies from Naples, led by the venerable condottiere Prospero Colonna, slipped through Venetian lines to meet an Imperial army and Swabian Landsknecht near Valeggio sul Mincio. Colonna had luck on his side as the situation inside Milan was unstable: 10,000 Swiss mercenaries supported the French governor-general, Odet de Foix, Vicomte de Lautrec, but Lautrec had funds for only 6,000. The Swiss soon requested an additional payment as a consequence of their rapid mobilization. An incredulous Lautrec had to sell his personal belongings, including his collar of the order of St. Michael, and borrow money from friends to meet Swiss demands. After establishing contact with the anti-French faction inside Milan and hearing of the desertion of many Swiss mercenaries, Colonna launched a surprise attack. The French, along with their remaining Swiss mercenaries and Venetian allies, could not hold Milan, and Lautrec withdrew with 12,000 men.

The Landsknecht had fought the Swiss on many occasions. Youtube, SandRhoman History

By early 1522, Colonna and the Imperial forces had retaken much of Lombardy, including the key cities of Como, Alessandria, Monza, and Pavia. Francesco II Sforza, now reinstated as duke of Milan, joined Colonna and brought additional reinforcements from Swabia and Tyrol via Bergamo. Despite the materiel support, Colonna realized that it was only a matter of time before the French and Swiss would launch a counter offensive in the new campaign season. He correctly surmised that the French would amass a superior force in numbers: In December 1521, Francis I hired 16,000 Swiss mercenaries from across the Confederation, except Zürich, as well as 3,000 Italian condottieri. Francis I consigned several units of the famed French gendarmerie to Lombardy and requested additional troops from Venice to join French forces. In early spring 1522, Lautrec’s French army and Swiss mercenaries tried to lure the Imperial armies out from Milan and into open battle near Pavia or Novara.

Outnumbered but not outmaneuvered, Colonna sought a protected location to where he could retreat until it was necessary to fight. He first moved his troops southwards to the fortified safety of the Monastery of Certosa, which lay approximately 24 km outside of Milan, along the road to Pavia. Colonna hoped to entice Lautrec to fight him there, but Lautrec was not fooled. He understood that Colonna now had the strategic advantage in any hypothetical battle. Lautrec deemed it wise to cut off Colonna’s lines of communication with Milan as well as his access to the Alpine passes. He therefore marched his troops in the direction of Monza. Colonna anticipated this reaction and moved quickly to reposition his own troops within the park of Bicocca – an ideal, secure position, merely 7 km to the northeast of Milan. The park was well-fortified by enclosure walls, a marshy foreground, a sunken road, and deep, watery ditches. Not only could Colonna build a rampant and artillery redoubts, but he could also defend and maintain communication lines with Milan via a bridge, which lay to the south of the park. Colonna positioned his Spanish arquebusiers, commanded by the Neapolitan Marquess of Pescara, Fernando d’Àvalos, and his Spanish pikemen and Swabian mercenaries, led by the legendary "Father of the Landsknechte," Georg von Frundsberg, along the rampart. Behind them, the Imperial artillery would stand ready in assistance. The imperial cavalry, commanded by Antonio de Leyva, would guard the southern perimeters of the park.

These gentlemen are so blinded that the loss of their own flesh and blood hardly worries them.

Zwingli’s comment on Swiss mercenaries upon learning of the Battle of Bicocca in May 1522

A Bloodbath at Bicocca

Upon pitching camp near the Imperial positions at Bicocca on April 26, 1522, Lautrec sent scouts to survey the land. Although Lautrec had decided that it would be best to starve the Imperial forces out from their positions, the impetuous Swiss demanded immediate payment, the right to return to home, or the commencement of hostilities. As had happened in earlier outbreaks of the Italian Wars, the French had not paid the Swiss on time. Disagreements and misunderstandings between the French and their Swiss mercenaries had already transpired earlier in the campaign season, when the Swiss refused an order from Anne de Montmorency (1493-1567), the French captain general of the Swiss contingent in the French army, to storm the city of Novara in March 1522. The fierce competitiveness between the leading Swiss captains – Albert vom Stein (c. 1484-1522), Arnold Winkelried of Unterwalden (c. 1480-1522) and Ulrich von Sax of St. Gallen (c. 1463-1538) – was yet another source of exasperation to the French. Nonetheless, given their large numbers, the Swiss held a strong position at the bargaining table in spite of their perceived intransigence. The Bernese Albert vom Stein, the chief of the Swiss mercenaries in French service, insisted that the Swiss attack the Imperial armies the next morning or else they would return across the Alps. Lautrec, left with no alternative course of action, agreed to his demands.

At the camp from the Bicocca the Swiss demanded pay, conge or battle. Illustration by Albert Robida, 1909. — **At the camp from the Bicocca the Swiss demanded pay, congé or battle. Illustration by Albert Robida, 1909.** Britannica Imagequest, © Bridgeman Images

On the morning of April 27, 1522, the Battle of Bicocca began. Montmorency commanded the Swiss mercenaries, composed of two large columns of 4,000 men, in the advance toward Colonna's entrenched Landsknechts and arquebusiers. Behind him stood an armed line of French infantry and the gendarmerie, commanded by Lautrec, while further back, Venetian soldiers formed a line of their own, led by their captain general, Francesco Maria della Rovere. Montmorency ordered the Swiss to halt so that French artillery could fire upon Imperial defenses. They refused to obey, and they marched straight into the range of the Spanish arquebusiers. In rapid but orderly succession, the Spanish arquebusiers and the Imperial artillery slaughtered a thousand Swiss from their redoubts before they had even reached the sunken road in front of Bicocca’s rampart. Some Swiss managed to wade through the carnage and scale the rampart to engage in hand-to-hand combat. That proved futile as the Landsknecht lay in wait. As a result of their intense rivalry on the battlefields of Europe and bitter memories of the Swabian War (1499), the Landsknecht unleashed their fury on the Swiss, executing them wherever encountered. Historians estimate that between 3,000-4,000 Swiss died at Bicocca; 22 Swiss captains also fell at the battle, including Albert vom Stein and Arnold Winkelried of Unterwalden.

**Schematic illustration of the Battle of Bicocca. French movements are shown in blue, Imperial movements in red.** Wikimedia

After half an hour, the Swiss retreated. According to legend, the Imperial Army suffered only one death, caused by a donkey’s kick. In actuality, Imperial losses stood around 200. As the Swiss made their disastrous attempt to overwhelm Imperial forces, the French calvary failed in their efforts to take the bridge to the south of Bicocca. Although Lautrec ordered the surviving Swiss to recommence their assault, they refused. Realizing the enemy position was impervious to attack, Lautrec withdrew from the field of battle thereafter. The Imperial commanders desired to pursue the French army in retreat, but Colonna demurred. The bulk of Lautrec's troops had not seen battle and remained dangerous. Colonna’s decision to avoid another round of combat was sagacious; the Swiss left for home on April 30, 1522.

They went back to their mountains diminished in numbers, but much more diminished in audacity; for it is certain that the losses they suffered at Bicocca so affected them that in their coming years they no longer displayed their vaunted vigour …

Francesco Guicciardini on the Swiss in the aftermath of Bicocca

Consequential Legacies

The Battle of Bicocca reaffirms the end of the heyday of the late-medieval Swiss pikemen. It also underscores the extent to which the behaviors of mercenaries contributed to the outcomes of battles during the Italian Wars. Never again would Swiss mercenaries brandishing pikes and halberds attempt to overtake an enemy line in battle. Bicocca additionally demonstrates the usefulness of combined manpower and gunpowder on the European battlefield. The transformation of the Spanish army through the development of new battle techniques and military engineering allowed Spain to win the Italian Wars. Spain thus became the preeminent power in sixteenth-century Europe. Henceforth, even the proud Swiss would be unable to escape the allure of Spanish military might and political power.

The specter of Bicocca affected internal politics in the Confederation as well. Zwingli’s opinions regarding mercenaries would become the source of his own undoing. Zürich lacked the capital that flowed from the mercenary system in addition to young men with seasoned military experience. As interconfessional tensions broke out between 1529-1531, Zürich was left vulnerable to attack. When a force of 2,000 Zürichers faced a force of at least 7,000 fighters from the Catholic Cantons at Kappel am Albis on October 11, 1531, they had no hope in securing a victory. The Battle of Kappel was won by Catholics who counted among their ranks numerous veterans of Bicocca, and Zwingli lost his life.

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