
Outwardly open, inwardly closed
The degree to which Swiss domestic and foreign policy are intertwined has seldom become so apparent as in 1994. That year, the electorate repeatedly opposed the Federal Council’s pursuit of international openness.
The results of these three referendums left the Federal Council facing a general loss of trust and confidence. A crisis meeting was called, at which members of the government went on record as saying that the country was divided. According to Federal Councillor and Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs Flavio Cotti, the political system in Switzerland now confronted a new kind of opposition, embodied by the biggest winner of the EEA referendum, Zurich SVP politician and member of the National Council Christoph Blocher, and his “erosive power”. Cotti defiantly stated for the record that: “The worst thing we could do would be to give up, admit that Blocher is right and capitulate in our foreign policy efforts.”
In November 1994, Swiss Federal Councillor and Justice Minister Arnold Koller therefore recommended to the Council of States Political Institutions Committee that the initiative should not be put to a national referendum. In the event of such a “complete departure from our country’s humanitarian tradition,” in the words of Arnold Koller, “we would cease to be a state based on the rule of law, and would find ourselves isolated internationally.” For the first time ever, the Federal Council wished to declare a popular initiative invalid due to its incompatibility with Switzerland’s commitments under international law. The Swiss parliament followed this recommendation in March 1996. To placate those expressing criticism, Federal Councillor Koller based his argument on the fact that asylum figures had fallen since the initiative was first submitted, and promised that the government would enact new coercive measures for deporting criminal asylum-seekers and foreign nationals.
At yet another meeting, the national government discussed whether and how members of the Federal Council should take part in this unusual new format. Transport Minister Adolf Ogi was still licking his wounds after his unfortunate appearance on the show dedicated to the Alps Initiative and Federal Councillor Kaspar Villiger – who had refused to participate in the Arena discussion on the Blue Helmets proposal – posed the fundamental question of whether members of the government should take part “in ringside battles with parliamentarians”. For Otto Stich, the incumbent Swiss President in 1994, “participation in adversarial broadcasts” was not a problem. He offered to step into the ring on 16 September and go toe to toe with the opponents. The unpretentious performance given on Arena by this seemingly strait-laced Social Democrat from the canton of Solothurn, who as Finance Minister championed a strict policy of cutbacks, may have helped the anti-racism penal provision (narrowly) gain acceptance.
Conversely, the by now omnipresent Blocher had already threatened to call for a referendum if too many concessions were made in the agreement. The Swiss Trade Union Federation also put pressure on the government by issuing a letter in which it gave an ultimatum for accompanying measures to be put in place to ensure that the hoped-for liberalisation would not lead to wage and social dumping. When the Federal Council adopted its negotiation mandate in December, it was therefore forced to choose between “two evils”. Taking domestic policy into account, it ultimately decided to grant its negotiators only limited room for manoeuvre in certain sub-areas of the free movement of persons.
New archival documents available online

On 1 January 2025, the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland research centre published around 1,700 historical sources on Swiss foreign policy in 1994 in its online database Dodis – just as the relevant dossiers become declassified by the Swiss Federal Archives. The documents cited in the text are available online, along with numerous other records relating to Switzerland’s international relations.


