**Portrait of General Ulrich Wille, c. 1915.** Swiss National Museum

General Wille – Switzerland’s popular and embattled military leader

In 1914, Switzerland mobilised and had to appoint a general. The Federal Council and Federal Assembly could not agree on whom to choose. Following a private chat with the other candidate, Ulrich Wille got the job.

Rudolf Jaun

Rudolf Jaun is professor emeritus of history at the University of Zurich and of military history at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich.

When the First World War broke out in August 1914, Switzerland declared a general mobilisation of its armed forces. This required the appointment of a supreme commander (SC) by the United Federal Assembly. It came down to two candidates: lieutenant general Theophil Sprecher von Bernegg and lieutenant general Ulrich Wille. The parliament backed Sprecher von Bernegg, whereas Wille was the Federal Council’s choice. And there was a sound rationale behind that: the national government wanted a general who could prepare the conscript armed forces for war in a few weeks through training and instruction. It was also keen to establish a potential direct channel to the German Kaiser, to Chief of the German General Staff Moltke, and the German generals. The Federal Council saw Ulrich Wille as the man who could do all those things. Sprecher von Bernegg was a meticulous general staff officer, whereas Wille was a strict military disciplinarian without general staff training or background. As the parliament preferred Sprecher von Bernegg, it seemed there would only be one winner. But it didn’t turn out like that.

Ulrich Wille’s proximity to German Kaiser Willhelm II – pictured here at the imperial manoeuvres in 1912 in the canton of St. Gallen – enhanced his credentials considerably in the Federal Council for his election to general. Theophil Sprecher von Bernegg is on the left next to Wille. Swiss National Museum

On the afternoon of 3 August 1914, Sprecher von Bernegg’s prospects of success received a boost. The President of the Federal Assembly asked him to don the uniform and prepare to march into the National Council Chamber. Ulrich Wille had already rented out a floor at Hotel Bellevue as his future headquarters. But things were not looking good for him. Nonetheless, Wille refused to throw in the towel and he went to visit Theophil Sprecher von Bernegg in his private apartment in the Kirchenfeld district of Bern. Wille convinced him to withdraw his candidature for the position of general in favour of becoming Chief of the General Staff of the mobilised armed forces. It is not known exactly which arguments Ulrich Wille presented, whether he made requests, threats or simply used his powers of persuasion. But one thing is certain, Sprecher von Bernegg had the credentials for either position, Wille did not. He only had experience in leading and instructing troops. The situation thus lent itself to a division of labour and Sprecher von Bernegg probably saw that. Sprecher von Bernegg’s withdrawal saved Wille’s campaign to be supreme commander and general. But why was there such opposition to Ulrich Wille in the Federal Assembly and in other quarters as well?

**General Wille set up his headquarters at Hotel Bellevue. Soldiers from the mountain artillery crossing Kirchenfeldbrücke in the First World War.** Wikimedia / Swiss Federal Archives

From dismissal to promotion

Ulrich Wille was a member of the Swiss drill officer corps in the artillery and became chief weapons officer for the cavalry in 1892. He was dismissed by the Federal Council four years later following a complaint he issued against a promotion that he didn’t agree with. This led to Wille being without a role in the armed forces, rendering him unemployed. A committee comprising instructor Fritz Gertsch, ETH professor Ferdinand Affolter and Emil Richard of the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry launched a media campaign against his detractors and lobbied for Wille’s return to the military. The outcome was his appointment to militia major general in 1901 and editor of the military journal ‘Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung’ and militia lieutenant general in 1904. Wille’s civilian career also picked up: initially as a lecturer and then professor of military science at ETH Zurich. Within a few years, Wille, who was born in Hamburg in 1848, had occupied all relevant positions of military significance.

**Committee meeting in the Wille family garden in Feldmeilen. From left: Clara Wille-von Bismarck, Emil Richard, Fritz Gertsch, Ferdinand Affolter and Ulrich Wille.** Zentralbibliothek Zürich

Wille first studied law in Zurich but had to leave the university following a duel. He went on to gain his doctorate in law at Heidelberg, which made him a complete anomaly in the Swiss officer corps. Drill officers with a doctorate were practically unheard of, as they tended to prove their skills on the job instead, with some even coming from the last Swiss mercenary regiment in Naples. Drill officers who wanted to make the Swiss conscript armed forces battle ready by following the Prussian-German model were even thinner on the ground. This led to Wille attracting both enthusiastic support and bitter opposition: after just a few years of drill service, Wille was both popular and embattled.

**Ulrich Wille the student, photographed in the late 1860s.** Wikimedia

**First lieutenant Wille on a visiting card portrait, c. 1881.** Swiss National Museum

Wille, who joined the Swiss drill corps in 1871, had always been ambitious. The victory of the Prussian-German army in 1870 in the Franco-Prussian war made a deep impression on him and he had the opportunity to learn the training methods of the guard artillery in Berlin. The corpulent first lieutenant began to study and then revolutionise troop training in the artillery schools of Thun. He quickly developed his lifelong credo of military socialisation: “Military instruction before drill – drill is an instruction method”. He had learned that in Berlin. But he set his sights beyond Thun and wanted to exercise his influence across the entire armed forces. Ulrich Wille bought the magazine ‘Artillerie und Genie’ (artillery and genius) where he started to criticise the military modus operandi, claiming it often resembled that of a village fire service. He increasingly identified “misguided perceptions” and preached ”a new mindset”. Wille was a militarily committed man armed with an acerbic and ironic-sarcastic writing style.

**First lieutenant Ulrich Wille also taught at the military school in Thun.** Wille Archive

He was uninhibited – not caring in the slightest about the opinions of others – in promoting the Prussian-German model of his military credo: “The militia can be reliably made battle ready, i.e. on a par with the resolve of the Prussian and German armed forces in 1866 and 1870”. He considered the Prussian-German troops as well trained, meaning they showed “obedience,” paid keen attention to orders from their officers and had the discipline to push through to victory despite sustaining losses. Wille was accused of Prussianism. Critics advocated “national mindset” over “new mindset”. The “Wille method” was controversial long before he became supreme commander of the Swiss armed forces in 1914. His troop training was, however, so successful that he was appointed in 1883 to teach courage and leadership to the slightly limp Swiss cavalry as head instructor and chief weapons officer.

**Full-length portrait of lieutenant general Ulrich Wille in Feldmeilen, taken before 1914.** Swiss National Museum

Wille was not just any drill instructor, he was a military expert steeped in the German cultural, societal and national concept of the German empire. He considered creating an army ready for war from the national population as the key to the continuation of the nation state, and Switzerland was no exception. War was potentially the ultimate test of a state’s right to exist and of the manliness of its citizens. He saw preparing the country’s soldiers for war as a way of rectifying the individualistic-egocentric bourgeois society.

General Council 1914 to 1918

Wille wanted the supreme command. He was 66 when he joined the General Council. 1914 to 1916 was a honeymoon period for him as he wasn’t particularly challenged militarily. When he visited the cantonal authorities, the people welcomed him warmly, as in Geneva and Neuchâtel. Chief of General Staff Sprecher von Bernegg was concerned about the lack of operational action, Wille did not sign one operational order. When the general wrote in jest to the Federal Council that it was an opportune juncture to attack the Entente, the Chief of General Staff knew nothing about it. From 1917, Switzerland’s economic and social situation deteriorated perceptibly. Prices soared everywhere and food supplies became increasingly precarious due to the economic war. Poor families only had emergency support to fall back on. The often long neutrality protection deployments of the active service units and a growing malaise among the troops plus the “drill instruction à la Wille” impacted troop morale. Wille responded to these problems with an avalanche of directives and warnings until the end of the war. He also had absolute authority to grant clemency, resulting in the rapid accumulation of pleas for a reprieve from people who had been convicted by court-martial. He continued writing and spent more and more time at his headquarters at Hotel Bellevue in Bern. He became increasingly stubborn with age. It was even discussed in the Federal Council whether Wille was senile, although he demonstrably was not.

**The dream team: Theophil Sprecher von Bernegg and Ulrich Wille (front right).** Wille Archive

Demonstrations, marches and strikes increased from 1917 in Switzerland due to declining living standards. The threat of violence was in the air. As supreme commander of the armed forces, Wille had to decide whether to deploy troops on the streets to keep order. He preferred to be proactive: show strength and have zero tolerance. Violent demonstrators were to be deterred by troops on the ground. This automatically made him appear an enemy of the left. They saw the general as a class enemy with the backing of the army. They attacked him in the media as a greedy member of the bourgeoisie.

1918 general strike: how to respond in the event of a socialist coup?

Matters came to a head for a much older – but in no way senile – Ulrich Wille in the summer of 1918. The united left led by Robert Grimm announced it would take political action in the form of a general strike if the Federal Council did not meet certain economic demands. According to the general strike theory propagated in Switzerland by Grimm, he was looking for an opportunity to seize power through revolution. Something the Russian revolution had shown could be done. The General Staff began planning how to use the army to quell any violent attempts at revolution. Wille saw the planned massive troop mobilisations as excessive. He believed it would be enough to have the cavalry surround Zurich. The general was in favour of sending most of the troops home.

**Message for the inhabitants of Zurich during the general strike in 1918.** Swiss National Museum

However, events in Zurich snowballed in November 1918. The Government Council anxiously sought refuge in the barracks and requested an armed guard. The Federal Council approved the request with the support of Ulrich Wille. A regiment marched into Zurich. The executive body of the left – the Oltener Aktionskomitee (OAK) – responded with a one-day strike in protest. The communist-run ‘Arbeiter-Union Zürich’ (Zurich workers’ union) refused to observe the one-day rule. So, to keep control, the OAK called for an indefinite general strike. This was enough to dispel Wille’s doubts about the need for a massive mobilisation. However, the final decision lay with Chief of General Staff Theophil Sprecher von Bernegg. An ultimatum threatening to arrest the strike leaders and disperse large gatherings of strikers by force had the desired effect: the nationwide general strike was called off. Wille’s strategy of prevention had worked and he credited himself with having done the right thing. Large sections of the population agreed with him and thought the army had prevented a revolution. Whereas in the eyes of the left, Wille would forever be the “bad guy” who struck down the general strike.

More of: 20th / 21st century Politics War/battle Article

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